

RESTRICTED

# Problem Profile

## Operation Protection on the



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## Document Control

| Version | Date     | Author                                | Department   | Comments |
|---------|----------|---------------------------------------|--|----------|
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## 1.0 Introduction

### 1.1 Aim

To analytically establish whether the organised trafficking and sexual exploitation of young females by older males (including situations where victims are raped and suffer a series of serious sexual assaults) is a major threat to the D3 Operational Command Unit (OCU).

### 1.2 Methodology

The girls that will be considered as a subject of Operation PROTECTION will include individuals nominated by Children's Services, Barnardos, the Police and Children's Society, as well as potential victims known to local (D3 OCU) resources. Details of all victims and offenders have been collated onto a standardised spreadsheet, which has enabled central Force Communications and Intelligence Service (FCIS) analysts to merge the findings of all West Midlands Police OCUs.

The extensive records that exist on many of the subjects make it unfeasible to fully evaluate all their associations (including people, phones, vehicles, addresses etc). In instances where the volume of information / intelligence is very large, the most recent data shall be deemed a priority (defined, not absolutely, as post January 2009).

In the first instance, ownership of any nominal will be established via their current address of residence being within the D3 boundary. However the nature of this Operation concerns human trafficking and, as such, the girls will frequent multiple areas and jurisdictions. Therefore, whether the subject has previously lived on the D3 and / or had a tendency to frequent the D3, will also be considered.

#### **How this document links with the FCIS Problem Profile: Operation PROTECTION.**

On the 12<sup>th</sup> March 2010, FCIS published the WMP profile for Operation PROTECTION, which has been appraised by ACC Cann and approved for an overall (Force) response to be coordinated through Public Protection Units (PPUs). The core aim of the project was to analytically establish whether the organised sexual exploitation of girls is a major threat to the WMP. The conclusion of that (and this) report is that it is. The analysis behind this (D3) document, was submitted to form part of the Force profile but is presented separately here to give a greater understanding of local issues and explore some of the considerations that were outside the remit of the FCIS document.



## 1.3 Terminology

Comprehensive analysis is set out through **inferences** formed from **key findings** and resulting in **recommendations**. These are summarised at the end of each section.

Also, a full list of the various acronyms, used in this document, can be found in Appendix 1 (page 30)

## 1.4 Limitations

### Time restrictions

Given the number of D3 nominals (victims and suspects) requiring research for this Operation, time restrictions have imposed the focus on more recent data (see 1.1.2 Methodology). Older records have therefore been excluded from this analysis.

### PROTECTION definitions

A definitive classification of who should be considered, as a victim has not been prescribed by PROTECTION. This is a necessary consequence of the nature of the operation and has meant that subjective criteria have had to be applied locally (see 1.1.2 Methodology). This is acknowledged in the FCIS profile for PROTECTION<sup>1</sup> and could inhibit the interpretation of results.

### Data Access

The Community Policing and Case Tracking system (usually abbreviated to COMPACT) is used to manage information on missing persons (also referred to as mispers). It is therefore the primary means of handling the investigation when any of the PROTECTION victims are reported missing. Although the system is widely available to officers, COMPACT does not inherently share its information with other databases. Time restraints precluded the author of this report being trained to access COMPACT and so this tool was not fully utilised in the analysis. Whilst it is relevant to highlight this limitation, it may have been mitigated due to Operation PENNYWHISTLE (see section 2.2 of this document).

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<sup>1</sup> Problem Profile: Operation Protection, FCIS/94/10, issued 12<sup>th</sup> March 2010. See section 1.3 – Limitations (page 5)



### End of Limitations section

#### Key Findings:

- This work has focused on the more recent data of nominals.
- There is no standardised definition as to who should be considered as a PROTECTION subject.

#### Inferences:

- Potentially relevant information may not be considered due to its historic nature.
- Inconsistent definitions of PROTECTION subjects will inhibit the interpretation of results.
- Further and / or additional details from COMPACT would have assisted this analysis.

#### Recommendations:

- Adequate time and / or resources should be available for any subsequent PROTECTION work, to allow the (often extensive) history of the subjects to be fully considered.
- Ensure all caveats concerning inclusion criteria for PROTECTION subjects are well publicised when results are being produced.
- Ensure authors of any subsequent PROTECTION work have direct access to COMPACT.



## 2.0 Current Situation

### 2.1 Whose Child Now

The issue of child sexual exploitation – the core theme of PROTECTION – was underlined in a report, published by the children’s charity Barnardo’s in November 2009, called ‘Whose Child Now’<sup>2</sup>. The report was the latest (since their first in 1998) to look at child sexual exploitation, and it “explores the continuing hidden nature of the problem” and suggests further action to “protect exploited children and young people”.

The following section of this document will provide a brief synopsis of that report - the reason for doing so is to provide a relevant context for this analysis, as well as gaining an appreciation of outside (i.e. non-police) findings and establishing current knowledge.

#### **‘Whose Child Now’ findings:**

The availability of local services to support sexually exploited children is [nationally] very poor. Where they *do* exist, the issue is more likely to be recognized, suggesting that the ‘absence’ of the problem in an area is potentially as a result of lack of organisational awareness.

Regular and / or prolonged periods of going missing are a key indicator of exploitation occurring, increasing the vulnerability of the child. Conversely, authorities may become more apathetic towards regular missing persons.

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<sup>2</sup> ‘Whose Child Now’, Barnardo’s, L Stacey, 2009 ([www.barnardos.org.uk/whose\\_child\\_now.pdf](http://www.barnardos.org.uk/whose_child_now.pdf))



The offenders operate in a highly organised manner. This can manifest itself as:

- The progressive increase in dependency and violence exerted by the abuser.
- The planning involved in trafficking the girls around the country.
- The use of legitimate business ventures as a smokescreen for criminal enterprise.

Conviction rates in relation to child exploitation are extremely low, despite new (and refined) offences being brought in under the Sexual Offences Act 2003. Prosecutions are undermined at two distinct stages:

- There is a tendency to blame the child for 'choosing' to become involved in risky situations. This preconception is totally at odds with the realisation that a child **cannot** consent to their abuse.
- The child does not consider themselves to be a victim - through guilt, shame or conditioning (under the regime of their abuser) - leading to fewer complaints being made to authorities (not to ignore the likely threats that could be made to coerce a victim into withdrawing a complaint on an occasion where one is actually made).

Although dismantling a child exploitation / trafficking network is resource intensive, the arrest of a single offender has been shown to provide the outlet that victims have needed to escape their exploitation. This presents an alternative option for safeguarding the children involved and introduces the concept of focusing on the 'primary' abuser within a group. In practical terms, this refers to the person upon whom the victim is most dependent (anecdotally, this could be the man that the girl considers to be her 'boyfriend').



**End of Whose Child Now section**

**Key Finding:** The arrest of an offender has been shown to be enough of an opportunity to allow a victim to escape their exploitation.

**Inference:** Police intervention – focused on *any* type of criminality that the offender is involved in – has the potential to safeguard the victim.

The above Key Finding and Inference are based solely on the Barnardo's report and have not been evidenced locally. As such, it may not justify adopting a recommendation to proactively deploy disruption tactics that impinge on any other criminality the suspect is involved in. Therefore, the following recommendation aims to substantiate the theory, rather than enforce the practice:

**Recommendation:** Analysis to corroborate whether the arrest – in relation to *any* offence - of an offender involved in trafficking and child sexual exploitation is an effective means to safeguard victims. Evidence could be based on intelligence debriefs of former victims (how did they escape victimisation?) and the experiences of other police forces / partners.

## 2.2 Operation PENNYWHISTLE

The exploitation of girls in care homes was recognised on the D3 before the creation of PROTECTION. The ramifications of its local predecessor – PENNYWHISTLE – are important in providing context for this issue on the OCU.

In March 2009, the D3 Vulnerable Persons Officer (VPO) initiated an operation that aimed to target offenders who sexually exploit young female residents in care homes. Operation PENNYWHISTLE advocated the approach of considering such abuse under the remit of internal (within the UK) sex trafficking – a principle part of legislation under the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA).

PENNYWHISTLE specified the characteristics of victims, offenders and locations. These were identified, respectively, as: female children, groups of Asian males and residential care homes<sup>3</sup>. These criteria were largely based on local observations and have proven to be appropriately pertinent to PROTECTION.

Although PENNYWHISTLE demonstrated an awareness of the whole issue, it also focused on specific victims. These included: [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED], [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] – all but one of which, are included in the PROTECTION analysis ([REDACTED] no longer resides on the D3).

See Appendix 2 for a full list of victims.

One of the key ways that PENNYWHISTLE sought to better manage the police response, was to ensure that as much of the relevant intelligence from COMPACT was being transferred to IMS as possible, enabling more police personnel to gain a fuller understanding of the of the girls' situation.

PENNYWHISTLE was completed on 7<sup>th</sup> February – after being superseded by PROTECTION – having brought much of the COMPACT information into the wider police system and raised the profile of trafficking of young females for the purposes of sexual exploitation.

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<sup>3</sup> [REDACTED]



End of Operation PENNYWHISTLE section

**Key Finding:** PENNYWHISTLE transferred intelligence from COMPACT to IMS.

**Inference:** The issue of information on victims being limited only to personnel with access to COMPACT has been minimised on the D3.



## 3.0 Analysis

The four subheadings that will be covered in the Analysis section of this document are: Victims, Offenders, Locations and Tactical Options.

Throughout these pages, there are frequent references to 'the chart'. This relates to the master version of the D3 PROTECTION association chart, produced using a piece of software called i2. The size of the chart makes it impractical for attachment to this document as an appendix. Only specific extracts (relevant to the point being made in the text) are shown. Where a chart is included, it should therefore not be considered as fully representative of *all* the links that an entity (i.e. the person, incident, location etc) may have.

## 3.1 Victims

There are currently 17 girls (no boys), which have been included as potential subjects for Operation PROTECTION, as a result of enquiries on the D3 OCU. These are listed in a table shown in Appendix 2 on page 31. Most (65%) are white European ethnicity, with an age range of 11 to 17 years (with an average age of 15).

### Missing Persons

The findings of 'Whose Child Now' (see section 2.1) revealed the risk of exploitation increased with regular and / or prolonged periods of going missing<sup>4</sup>. Whilst this measure of vulnerability can only act as an indicator (the girls are plausibly just as at-risk when they are legitimately absent from home), it is notable that fourteen of the seventeen girls identified by the D3 have been recorded as missing on COMPACT. The number of times that each girl has been reported missing ranges from three to seventy-seven<sup>5</sup>, however a single [missing] episode may be all that is required for exploitation to occur. For this reason, it is also relevant to look at the *length* of the missing period as a potentially more accurate means of assessing vulnerability.

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<sup>4</sup> Whose Child Now', Barnardos's, L Stacey, 2009 ([www.barnardos.org.uk/whose\\_child\\_now.pdf](http://www.barnardos.org.uk/whose_child_now.pdf)), page 9

<sup>5</sup> As per COMPACT on 18.03.2010.



The table below lists 14 of the D3 PROTECTION victims down the left hand side and, to the right of their name, is the approximate<sup>6</sup> number of times they have been reported missing. This total is then broken down into three categories of duration: found within an hour, found between 2 and 24 hours and found after 24 hours. The yellow column shows this as a whole number and the green column translates that number to a percentage. The rows have been sorted in descending order by percentage of times found after 24 hours then by number of times reported missing.

| Name       | Number of times Reported Missing | Number of times found within 1 hour |    | Number of times found between 2 and 24 hours |    | Number of times found after 24 hours |    |
|------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|----|--|----|--------------------------------------|----|
|            |                                  | No.                                 | %  | No.  | %  | No.                                  | %  |
| ██████████ | 8                                | 0                                   | 0  | 1  | 13 | 7                                    | 88 |
| ██████████ | 11                               | 2                                   | 18 | 3  | 27 | 6                                    | 55 |
| ██████████ | 4                                | 1                                   | 25 | 1  | 25 | 2                                    | 50 |
| ██████████ | 27                               | 1                                   | 4  | 14   | 52 | 12                                   | 44 |
| ██████████ | 77                               | 5                                   | 6  | 45   | 58 | 27                                   | 35 |
| ██████████ | 30                               | 6                                   | 20 | 14   | 47 | 10                                   | 33 |
| ██████████ | 15                               | 0                                   | 0  | 10   | 67 | 5                                    | 33 |
| ██████████ | 12                               | 2                                   | 17 | 6  | 50 | 4                                    | 33 |
| ██████████ | 3                                | 1                                   | 33 | 1  | 33 | 1                                    | 33 |
| ██████████ | 22                               | 0                                   | 0  | 16   | 73 | 6                                    | 27 |
| ██████████ | 19                               | 4                                   | 21 | 13   | 68 | 2                                    | 11 |
| ██████████ | 18                               | 7                                   | 39 | 9  | 50 | 2                                    | 11 |
| ██████████ | 28                               | 5                                   | 18 | 22   | 79 | 1                                    | 4  |
| ██████████ | 3                                | 1                                   | 33 | 2  | 67 | 0                                    | 0  |

The table on the previous page indicates that the frequency of times a girl has been reported missing is not necessarily an accurate way of determining how prolonged that period of absence is. For example, ██████████ is the most frequent misper, at 77 COMPACT records. However she is usually (58% of the time) found between 2 and 24 hours of going missing.

██████████ on the other hand, has been reported missing *only* 8 times yet has not been picked up within 24 hours on 7 (88%) of those occasions.

Given that both criteria (frequency and duration) are valid indicators of risk, these results demonstrate that any undertaking to monitor potential victims of PROTECTION draws in candidates from both ends of the COMPACT spectrum. It should be noted however, that both measures are statistical in nature and cannot replace (or replicate) the professional knowledge and assessment of the circumstances and intelligence concerning each individual victim.

<sup>6</sup> Some duplicates have been removed, meaning that the total may not be exactly the same as COMPACT.



**D3 Victims in Context**

Although the raw figure of 17 victims is sufficient to appreciate that the threat to the D3 OCU is high, it is also useful to see this number in the context of other WMP OCUs. The table to the right lists the OCUs by the number of victims that have been identified as part of the initial PROTECTION analysis.



| OCU                | Number of Protection Victims |
|--------------------|------------------------------|
| J1                 | 21                           |
| D3                 | 17                           |
| G2                 | 17                           |
| Coventry           | 12                           |
| E1                 | 12                           |
| F2                 | 10                           |
| L                  | 10                           |
| H1                 | 9                            |
| F3                 | 8                            |
| D1                 | 7                            |
| E2                 | 5                            |
| K1                 | 3                            |
| K2                 | 3                            |
| E3                 | 2                            |
| D2                 | 1                            |
| J2                 | 1                            |
| K2 + K1            | 1                            |
| <b>Grand Total</b> | <b>139</b>                   |

It is important to remember that the limitation - concerning PROTECTION definitions (see section 1.4 of this document) – is still applicable to these results. For example, J1 may have applied a more liberal interpretation of who qualifies as a PROTECTION victim, compared to the J2. It can also be noted that not all OCUs have submitted a response.

However, accepting the caveats on how the data was determined, the results do support the inference that the D3 (and the geographical area that it will come to represent in the forthcoming transition to Birmingham East LPU) is vulnerable to child sexual exploitation offences and is likely to play a pivotal role in managing and monitoring victims.

**Childrens Homes**

Thirteen of the girls (76%) are in non-parental care, be that a foster home or – more commonly – a children’s home. It is



residency at the same children’s home that is the most reliable means of establishing an association between the girls. Although there are ten childrens homes listed on the association chart, the extract below demonstrates how connections between PROTECTION victims can be established via their care home addresses:



There is no clear evidence to suggest that the childrens homes are where the girls may be being initially groomed for exploitation, however introductions via other girls – and their associates - seem a likely possibility.



**End of Victims section****Key Findings:**

- Fourteen (82%) of the girls identified as D3 PROTECTION victims are mispers.
- Frequency of missing episodes is not *solely* an accurate means of determining risk of sexual exploitation.
- The D3 OCU has been identified as amongst the West Midlands Police OCUs with the highest numbers of PROTECTION victims.
- Over three quarters of the D3 PROTECTION victims are living in non-parental care.

**Inference:**

- Female mispers are more likely to be at risk of sexual exploitation.
- Professional knowledge and assessment concerning the circumstances and intelligence around each individual girl is more crucial to prioritising at-risk victims than purely statistical data on missing episodes.
- Following the transition away from OCU boundaries, the Birmingham East LPU is particularly vulnerable to the offences and victimisation issues associated with PROTECTION.

Although the childrens home links (see previous page) suggest that introductions by other girls may be the means by which victims become associated with offenders, there is not enough evidence to infer that this is often the case on the D3. The first of the following recommendations is therefore aimed at closing this intelligence gap.

**Recommendation:**

- Intelligence debriefs of victims to ascertain the circumstances in which they were introduced to suspects / offenders, in order to understand grooming methods and formulate prevention responses.
- Birmingham East LPU Public Protection Unit should play a pivotal role in managing and monitoring PROTECTION victims. This must be given consideration when allocating the necessary resources.

### 3.2 Offenders

There are ten offenders / suspects identified as being of concern to PROTECTION on the D3. These are listed in a table shown in Appendix 3 on page 32 All but one (90%) of these offenders is male (the only female – [REDACTED] – is discussed later in this section); all are Asian ethnicity, with an age range of 17 to 41 years (but with an average age of 22).

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



Links to organised criminality

Several of the alleged offenders who live on the D3 are associated with a local Urban Street Gang (USG) called the [REDACTED] These individuals are listed in the table below:

| First Name | Surname    | Date of Birth | Custody Reference                         |
|------------|------------|---------------|---|
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] Rape [REDACTED]                |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] Rape, [REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] Rape, [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] Rape, [REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] Rape, [REDACTED]               |
| [REDACTED] | [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]    | [REDACTED] Rape, [REDACTED]               |

The incident(s) that brought these offenders to the attention of PROTECTION are referenced by their custody records (column on the right of the table above) however three of these nominals are also discussed in section 3.3 (see page 22).



[REDACTED]

The links between the individuals and locations that are described in the following paragraphs are also represented in the extract from the complete D3 PROTECTION network chart, shown on the page opposite:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

---

7 [REDACTED]  
8 [REDACTED]





## End of Offenders section

**Key Finding:**

- Several of the identified suspects for PROTECTION have known links to an Urban Street Gang.
- [REDACTED] has associations with several PROTECTION victims and has previously [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

**Inference:**

- Suspects' gang affiliations facilitate the systematic nature of the sexual abuse through established contacts.
- [REDACTED] is actively involved in organising 'events' where girls are exploited

**Recommendation:**

- Complete a Subject profile on [REDACTED] to gain a greater understanding of her activities and associations in order to appreciate the extent to which she may be involved in the organisation of 'events' where girls are exploited.

### 3.3 Locations

Most of the addresses that have been included in the chart analysis are home address. However there are several locations linked to offences. Two of these addresses are not actually on the D3 but are relevant due to associations through victims and offenders:

| Address                  | Offence                              | Reference  |
|--------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------|
| [REDACTED]               | Rape of a female child aged 13-15    | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED]               | Rape of a female 16 or over          | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] | Abduction of a child by other person | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] | Abduction of Child by Other Person   | [REDACTED] |
| [REDACTED]<br>[REDACTED] | Rape of female child aged 13-15      | [REDACTED] |

Of particular note are the [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]. These are analysed in greater depth over the next few pages:

[REDACTED]

The links between the individuals and locations that are described in the following paragraphs are also represented in the extract from the complete D3 PROTECTION network chart, shown below:

[REDACTED]


[REDACTED] 9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] 10. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



9 [REDACTED]  
10 [REDACTED]



[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] 11. [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

[Redacted] 12.


[Redacted]

[Redacted] 13.

Excerpt From Full D3 PROTECTION Chart (as on 10.03.10), Showing Entities Linked to [Redacted]

ON Date of Birth  
Event Start Date

House Male Crime Girl Unknown Female LINK



11 [Redacted]  
12 [Redacted]  
13 [Redacted]



End of Locations section

Key Findings:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Inference:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Based on a single (known) incident, it is impossible to establish whether an ambivalent attitude of hotel staff [to confront suspicious behaviour] facilitates sexual exploitation of young females [REDACTED]

Recommendation:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]



### 3.4 Tactical Options

Where it is not possible to proceed with a prosecution or to secure a conviction for a substantive offence, there are alternative / additional options that can be considered for deployment in PROTECTION cases. Three of these are considered in turn:

#### Sexual Offences Prevention Orders

Sexual Offences Prevention Orders (SOPO) are civil orders that allow prohibitive conditions to be imposed on a defendant without resorting to criminal law. However the breach of a SOPO is a criminal offence (punishable with up to 5 years imprisonment).

To make a valid application for a SOPO the police must demonstrate two things to the court:

- That the person has been dealt with in respect of an offence listed at Schedule 3 or at Schedule 5 (of the SOA).
- That, since the date on which they were first received a conviction, caution, finding etc for a sexual offence under Schedule 3 or Schedule 5, the person has acted in such a way as to give reasonable cause to believe that a SOPO is necessary.

Two of the benefits of SOPOs are that hearsay evidence is admissible (because the civil standard of proof applies) and the police do not need to call any victim - previous or potential – to give evidence. These two facets of SOPOs may make them effective against PROTECTION offenders, in instances where the victim will not cooperate.

An SOPO may be made against a defendant with a conviction, caution or finding for an offence under Schedule 3 or Schedule 5 of the SOA 2003. The benefit of counting offences under Schedule 5, is the inclusion of violent offences that aren't sexual in nature.

The SOPOs must be necessary to 'protect the public (or any particular members of the public) from serious sexual harm'. It is therefore not possible to take out a SOPO on a violent offender if there is *only* a risk of them committing a violent offence.

The prohibitions under a SOPO can be wide ranging, although it cannot require affirmative action (except to register as a sex offender).

SOPOs are a public protection tool that demands a high degree of police resources and require active monitoring to ensure the community is protected and that the order remains relevant.

The minimum duration for a full (as opposed to interim) order is five years unless both parties (i.e. the police and the offender) consent to discharge the order.



## Risk of Sexual Harm Orders

The SOA introduced Risk of Sexual Harm Orders (RSHO) as means of imposing prohibitions on persons who have, on at least two occasions:

- Engaged in sexual activity involving a child or in the presence of a child;
- Caused or incited a child to watch a person engaging in sexual activity or to look at a moving or still image that is sexual;
- Given a child anything that relates to sexual activity or contains a reference to such activity;
- Communicated with a child, where any part of the communication is sexual.

The sanctions that can be imposed on a defendant must be necessary for the purposes of protecting any child from harm.

RSHOs have not been utilised on the D3, however this is also true of the West Midlands Police as a whole: with only one being successfully obtained by the force<sup>14</sup>. Although RSHOs don't require the suspect to have previous convictions for sexual offences, they are (in other respects) very prescriptive. Proving the risk of serious harm and the need for at least one of the 'occasions' of concern to have occurred within the preceding 6 months are two clear examples of the restrictive stipulations of RSHOs.

The maximum penalty for breach of an RSHO is 5 years imprisonment.

## Harbouring Notices

Harbouring notices are more regularly deployed on the D3. These are letters, issued to suspects, in respect of a specific child being associated with them (e.g. staying in their house, travelling in their vehicle etc) without the permission / authority of the child's guardian. The notice prohibits the suspect from contacting the child or coercing them into inappropriate behaviour (such as running away from home).

In terms of prosecution, Harbouring notices draw on sections of the Children Act 1989 and Child Abduction Act 1984. Although they are fairly easy to obtain and serve, they do refer to a very specific suspect engaging with a very specific child. This minimise the effectiveness of the order when, for example, a girl who is known to be at risk associates with multiple, unknown males.

The maximum sentence for these offences (collectively) is 7 years imprisonment.

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<sup>14</sup> Confirmed by WMP MAPPA Support Team on 03.03.2010

### End of Tactical Options Section

#### Key Findings:

- When applying for Sexual Offence Protection Orders, hearsay evidence is admissible, no victim needs to be called and violent offences are considered relevant.
- Only one Risk of Sexual Harm Order has been obtained by the West Midlands Police.
- Harboring notices are regularly issued on the D3.

#### Inferences:

- Sexual Offence Protection Orders would provide a flexible and enforceable means of managing PROTECTION offenders who cannot be convicted for more substantive (sexual) offences.
- Risk of Sexual Harm Orders are not used as a prevention / enforcement tactic due to their requirements being highly prescriptive.
- Harboring notices are specific to individuals and will therefore have a limited impact on prolific offenders.

#### Recommendation:

- Where to relevant application criteria are met, Sexual Offence Protection Orders should be considered as the most effective means of managing the most serious PROTECTION offenders.



## 4.0 Conclusion

The sexual exploitation and trafficking of girls in care is, and has been, a prevalent issue on the D3 and is a significant threat to the OCU. Even when the transition away from OCU boundaries occurs, PROTECTION will remain a major risk to the Birmingham East Local Policing Unit (LPU).

West Midlands Police now has the analytical basis to prioritise PROTECTION according to the threat it poses, however the limitations that inhibit a more accurate understanding of sexual exploitation of young girls need to be addressed. This has implications not only for technical questions about how the WMP records and access information and intelligence, but also touches on more fundamental issues of the approach police adopt when dealing with mispers.

As much as a statistical tool to identify victims would be desirable, specific knowledge of a girl's personal circumstances is essential. Where securing a conviction for a substantive offence is not possible, alternative means of disruption are sometimes available but their limitations for deployment should be recognised.

PROTECTION presents significant challenges for WMP and partner agencies. The acknowledgment (together with the beginnings of an organised response) of the problem has now been recognised at ACC level and will be addressed. This document may confirm that there is an unequivocal need for such action, but it merely scratches the surface of how that might be achieved.



## 5.0 Recommendations

For easy reference, a summary of all the recommendations made within this document. Is shown below:

### Recommendations:

- Adequate time and / or resources should be available for any subsequent PROTECTION work, to allow the (often extensive) history of the subjects to be fully considered.
- Ensure all caveats concerning inclusion criteria for PROTECTION subjects are well publicised when results are being produced.
- Ensure authors of any subsequent PROTECTION work have direct access to COMPACT.
- Analysis to corroborate whether the arrest – in relation to *any* offence - of an offender involved in trafficking and child sexual exploitation is an effective means to safeguard victims. Evidence could be based on intelligence debriefs of former victims (how did they escape victimisation?) and the experiences of other police forces / partners.
- Intelligence debriefs of victims to ascertain the circumstance in which they were introduced to suspects / offenders, in order to understand grooming methods and formulate prevention responses.
- Birmingham East LPU Public Protection Unit should play a pivotal role in managing and monitoring PROTECTION victims. This must be given consideration when allocating the necessary resources.
- Complete a Subject profile on [REDACTED] to gain a greater understanding of her activities and associations in order to appreciate the extent to which she may be involved in the organisation of 'events' where girls are exploited.
- Meet with [REDACTED] management to establish their readiness to engage with police and look to raise awareness, review policy and provide staff support to deter / identify possible offenders.
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- Where to relevant application criteria are met, Sexual Offence Protection Orders should be considered as the most effective means of managing the most serious PROTECTION offenders.




## 6.0 Appendix

### 6.1 Appendix 1 - Acronyms

|           |   |
|-----------|---|
| ACC -     | Assistant Chief Constable                     |
| COMPACT – | Community Policing and Case Tracking          |
| FCIS –    | Force Communications and Intelligence Service |
| IMS –     | Intelligence Management System                |
| LPU -     | Local Policing Unit                           |
| Misper –  | Missing Person                                |
| MO -      | Modus Operandi                                |
| OCU –     | Operation Command Unit                        |
| PPU -     | Public Protection Unit                        |
| RSHO -    | Risk of Sexual Harm Orders                    |
| SOA –     | Sexual Offences Act 2003                      |
| SOPO –    | Sexual Offences Prevention Order              |
| USG -     | Urban Street Gang                             |
| █ -       | █   |
| VPO –     | Vulnerable Persons Officer                    |
| WMP -     | West Midlands Police                          |



**6.2 Appendix 2 – D3 Victim Table (as on 18.03.2010)**



**6.3 Appendix 3 – D3 Offender Table (as on 18.03.2010)**



END OF DOCUMENT

